Pedagogy against disutopia: from conscientization to the education of desire by Amsler, Sarah
Sarah S. Amsler 1 
Pedagogy against “dis-utopia”: 
From conscientization to the education of desire  
 
Dr. Sarah S. Amsler 
s.amsler@kingston.ac.uk  
September 2007 
 
DRAFT 
 
 
 
Not only does society, as it is presently structured, keep people 
immature but every serious attempt to shift it – I’m avoiding the 
word ‘educate’ deliberately – to shift it towards maturity is 
immediately met with indescribable resistances, and all the evil in 
the world at once finds its most eloquent advocates, who will prove 
to you that the very thing you are attempting to achieve has either 
long been overtaken or is utopian or is no longer relevant. What I’d 
really like to leave our listeners to think about is a particular 
phenomenon, which is all too often pushed aside in the enthusiasm 
which accompanies the desire to change things – that is, that any 
serious attempts to intervene in order to alter our world in any 
specific area immediately come up against the overwhelming force 
of inertia in the prevailing situation, and seem condemned to 
impotence. Anyone who wishes to bring about change can probably 
only do so at all, by turning that very impotence, and their own 
impotence, into an active ingredient in their own thinking and 
maybe in their own actions too. 
 
Theodor Adorno (1999: 32) 
 
Critical sociology and the possibility of possibility 
 
In August 2007, over six thousand sociologists gathered in New York to attend 
the 102nd meeting of the American Sociological Association and discuss the 
possibility of radical social transformation in post-modern capitalist society.1 The 
adoption of the conference theme ‘Is another world possible?’ was theoretically 
significant, for it seemed to call into question one of the most fundamental 
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 102nd annual meeting of the 
American Sociological Association (New York) in August 2007. 
 
1 My characterization of contemporary (northern/western) society as both post-modern 
and capitalist draws on Frederic Jameson’s Postmodernity: The cultural logic of late 
capitalism (1991) and David Harvey’s Condition of Post-modernity: An enquiry into the 
origins of cultural change (1991). It is also informed by Adorno’s (1968) insistence that 
such definitions are more than mere nomenclature, as they shape the choices we make 
about which theoretical categories are most relevant and appropriate for analyzing a 
society.   
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assumptions upon which critical sociology depends: that despite the rarity of 
radical social change, it is possible, desirable and even imperative to imagine and 
struggle for better alternatives to existing ways of being. From phenomenological 
insights into the contingency of our subjective interpretations of reality to the 
imperative of reconciling ‘appearance’ with ‘reality’; from the long history of 
collective movements to defend human dignity to the ‘politics of small things’ 
(Goldfarb 2006), critical theories of society presume that human fates are not 
determined and futures are not reified, and that the possibility of possibility is a 
precondition for ‘normal’ human existence. This is not to say that progressive 
alternatives to the status quo are not often and everywhere repressed to some 
degree and in some form, or that they are equally distributed or attainable. But 
as Gustavo Gutierrez once remarked, a ‘commitment to the creation of a just 
society and, ultimately, to a new human being, presupposes confidence in the 
future’ (2003: 197).  
 
The commitments of critical sociology also hinge on another, often less 
recognized assumption that the human condition itself is grounded in the 
existence or potentiality of a pre-theoretical and universal human need or desire 
to transcend, to self-determine, to be. Hence, while the project of struggling to 
create a better world is often framed as a problem of removing political, 
economic, cultural and psychological barriers to social change, for critical 
theorists it also begs questions about the social constitution of deep subjective 
impulses, the essence or contingency of ‘human nature’, and the possibility of 
educating people to need and desire differently than they presently do. The 
question of whether ‘another world is possible’, therefore, also communicates a 
new (and perhaps long overdue) ambivalence about basic sociological concepts of 
structure and agency, subjective and objective culture, and the definition of basic 
human needs and desires.  
 
Furthermore, beneath the question’s scholastic veneer lies a palpable fear that 
contemporary society is already becoming something other than what it has 
been; other, perhaps, than it appears to be; and other than what it might 
potentially or ought to become. Unlike the bold assertions of political activists 
that another world is and must be possible (de Sousa Santos 2003; George 2004; 
Skrimshire 2006; Tarrow 2005), the question of whether the claim is 
sociologically viable belies the anxiety of a profession alienated both from its own 
philosophical roots and from the people with whom it claims to speak. It is the 
anxiety that even if social scientists are able to develop the cognitive tools to 
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understand why these processes are occurring, we lack the confidence, 
imagination, relationships, means and will to interrupt or resist them. It is thus a 
humbling, almost despairing question, for it does not even go so far as to ask, 
‘can we build a better world together?’ There is no obvious ‘we’, no unanimous 
definition of ‘better’, and a credible anti-authoritarian fear of imposing or 
presuming shared purpose where none actually exists. In fact, we now fear that 
even previous assurances were romanticized illusions – for example, as Zygmunt 
Bauman points out, orthodox beliefs in the revolutionary potential of ‘the working 
class’ not only homogenized workers but also mistook a need for security rather 
than a desire for revolution as the motivating factor for collective action 
(Jacobsen and Tester 2007). And although we are situated in the midst of a long 
and fruitful cultural turn in the critical social sciences, two perennial dilemmas 
continue to break ground: ‘how to maintain social solidarity amidst the 
celebration of difference, and how to ground normative evaluation of action 
amidst the decline of cultural authority’ (Jacobs and Hanrahan 2005: 1). The shift 
from asking how we can tactically effect radical social change to asking whether it 
is humanly possible at all, given the post-modern critique of enlightenment 
notions of ‘agency’ and more difference-focused definitions of freedom and 
justice, suggests a general decline of professional confidence in the sociological 
‘normality’ of the possibility of radical social change.  
 
I would like to suggest that it is also a manifestation of several wider dilemmas 
more specific to critical theory.2 First there is the question of whether the 
analytical and normative projects of critical social science can be legitimately 
grounded in the absence of an empirically verifiable, ‘quasi-sociological 
specification of an emancipatory interest in society itself’ (Honneth 2007: 65). 
Second, the problems of where such a pre-theoretical, pre-pedagogical need or 
desire originates, and what its relation to the material structures of society might 
be, have not yet been satisfactorily resolved within the critical tradition. Third, 
the absence of an adequate theory of either normative judgment or human need 
makes it difficult to articulate and justify potential strategies of emancipatory 
action. And finally, the role of radical, critical hope in legitimizing faith in the 
possibility of possibility – the sort of speculative, normative, militant hope that is 
maintained in spite of appearance; which enables a style of critique that ‘speaks 
against the facts and confronts [bare] facticity with its better potentialities’ 
(Marcuse 1989: 64) – remains unclear and extremely contested. Hope thus 
                                                 
2 For further views on the ‘impasses’ of ‘post-Habermasian’, ‘post-1989’ and ‘post-9/11’ 
critical theory, see Kompridis (2005). 
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appeals again, as Theodor Adorno once imagined, to its ongoing ‘Court of Appeal’ 
(Adorno 1951).  
 
Critical theory and critical pedagogy: challenges in theory and practice 
 
These dilemmas are gaining visibility in new scholarship about hope and utopia 
(Browne 2005; Crapanzano 2003; Smith 2005). However, in this essay I would 
like to illustrate how they are also taking shape in applied critical theory, 
specifically, in the current movement to rehabilitate concepts of ‘critical hope’ and 
‘utopia’ through critical pedagogy (Ainley and Canaan 2005; Canaan 2002, 2005; 
van Heertum 2006).3 There are not only strong parallels between philosophical 
and pedagogical developments in social critique, but also unfinished pedagogical 
projects within critical theory itself. And while critical educators often ground their 
pedagogical work in the theoretical tradition, critical theorists have much to learn 
from the challenges that their philosophical work creates in politico-educational 
and cultural practice.  
 
The critical education movement is conceptualized both as an ‘educational 
dimension of the struggles within and against neo-liberalism’ (Coté et al. 2007: 
3), and more generally as a form of democratic political pedagogy (Jameson 
1984; Giroux 2004a). It manifests in new ways a classical paradox of critical 
theory: that ‘the forces that were to bring about the transformation [of capitalist 
society] are suppressed and appear to be defeated’ (Marcuse 1989: 63), and 
more specifically that ‘the forces of domination have rendered problematic the 
very possibility for critical thinking’ (Aronowitz 1985: 119). On the one hand, 
educational institutions (universities in particular) are being dramatically 
transformed by the expansion of post-modern capitalist culture, the colonization 
of relatively autonomous cultural spaces by economic and bureaucratic logics, 
managerial control over professional and intellectual identity, and the reformation 
of teaching and learning as instrumentalized and commercial practices.4 It is 
                                                 
3 ‘Critical pedagogy’ is not a homogenous practice, but a label which unifies diverse and 
competing disciplines and practices. It includes, among other things, cultural studies, 
popular education, postcolonial theory, anarchist education, feminist pedagogy and 
autonomist Marxism. Here, however, I am interested in the conviction – shared across 
though not necessarily within the different traditions – that education can be a counter-
hegemonic or post-hegemonic means of political agency (see Coté et al. 2007 for further 
discussion). 
 
4 For more about the structural and cultural transformation of the academy, particularly in 
Britain and the United States, see Ainley et al. (2001), Ainley and Canaan (2005), Beck 
(1999, 2002), Crowther et al. (2000), Gaianguest (1998), Giroux (2004, 2004a, 2007), 
Gray (2003), Harris (2005), McLaren and Farahmandpur (2001), Ryan (2000), and 
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argued that these processes have taken hold within institutions of knowledge-
production themselves; that ‘the introduction of corporate standards and an 
external mode of scrutiny are changing the culture and ethos of the university’ 
(Harris 2005: 428), perhaps to the point that the process is ‘killing thinking’, or at 
least its more radical potential (Evans 2005). There is a sense, therefore, that ‘at 
a moment when higher education…is needed to focus on issues and help realise 
broad humanitarian goals, its vision and focus is being narrowed to meet 
utilitarian economic ends’ (Canaan 2005: 76). 
 
On the other hand, however, educational institutions continue to be viewed as 
sites of resistance to the very forces that make them into institutions of 
domination.5 Pedagogy is hence understood as a form of direct political struggle 
over the ideological construction of reality, and as a potential method of 
resistance to the bureaucratization, homogenization, instrumentalization, 
marketization and de-democratization of human need, desire and ethical will. This 
focus on the ideational and on deep subjectivity is qualitatively different from 
many traditional interpretations of critical pedagogy, which are more concretely 
grounded in the pursuit of ‘conscientization’ in direct relation to more specific 
political struggles (Freire 1992, 2001, 2005). In this sense, critical pedagogy 
asserts that individuals’ analyses of the social world mediate their existing 
limitations and possibilities. By reorganizing or ‘re-cognizing’ their perceptions 
and cognitive maps, and by identifying both their ‘limit situations’ and the 
concrete actions that they can take to overcome them, people can become 
conscious of their pre-existing desires and will to transcendence. This in turn 
motivates them to undertake willed transformative action for changing their social 
conditions and engaging in collective struggle. Put more simply, it is a practice in 
which ‘we listen to our students and support their efforts to articulate and 
                                                                                                                                            
Thompson (2000). Specific concerns include (1) government policies to ‘widen 
participation’, with student numbers increasing by 88% between 1989 and 2002, while 
state funding decreased by 37% during the same period; (2) the erasure of public spheres 
and democratic spaces and the dominance of organised, programmatic and assessed 
activities; (3) the domination of neo-liberal languages and practices that frame academic 
work in terms of quality assessment, transparency exercises, best practice, indicators, 
competencies, audits, and outcomes; (4) the managerialization of the academy; (5) the 
commodification of knowledge as something that can be bought and sold rather than as a 
public good or social practice; (6) the intensification of labour for both students and 
academics; and (7) the disengagement of the university from radical social politics. 
 
5 The meaning of ‘educational institutions’ can be broadly interpreted. Henry Giroux, for 
example, cites Stuart Hall’s definition of pedagogy as being ‘at work in all of those public 
places where culture works to secure identities; it does its bridging work negotiating the 
relationship between knowledge, pleasure and values; and it renders authority both crucial 
and problematic in legitimating particular social practices, communities and forms of 
power’ (Giroux 2000: 354). 
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understand limits to their lives so that they can recognise and work to lessen 
these limits and those of others’ (Canaan 2007: 74). In other words, critical 
pedagogy is often assumed to be an inherent source of hope because it disrupts 
and denounces the illusion of historical fate and liberates emergent utopian 
impulses through which self-determination is announced (da Veiga Coutinho 
1974: 11). 
 
But critical educators are now asking what relevance this understanding of 
pedagogy might have in a society where desires for individual transcendence and 
social change are or appear to be absent, devalued or denied. What are the 
possible consequences of conscientization in conditions where exposing complex 
power relations and dominant social forces emboldens fatalistic emotions rather 
than transforming them into hope; where, to paraphrase a well-worn theory, we 
see through ideologies and yet still buy into them? Or as Henry Giroux more 
poignantly asks – and here what appears as hyperbole must be understood in the 
context of contemporary American political culture and the moral indignities of 
Abu Ghraib – ‘what resources and visions does hope offer…when most attempts 
to interrupt the operations of an incipient fascism appear to fuel a growing 
cynicism rather than promote widespread individual and collective acts of 
resistance?’ (Giroux 2002: 38) What become of efforts to democratize knowledge 
when consuming publics democratically demand authoritarian teaching, or when 
self-realization is defined as the skilful adaptation to an existing order of things?  
 
In such circumstances, ‘critical hope’ becomes a paradoxical problematic rather 
than an assumed outcome of critical education. If the need or desire for personal 
transcendence or social change is not taken for granted as pre-existing or 
immanent, then the object of critical pedagogy must either be to create them, or 
to create the conditions for their emergence. The aim of educating against the 
ideological forces of post-modern capitalism is therefore neither simply to re-
cognize the social world, nor to create conditions of emancipatory communication. 
Instead, it is to produce the value orientations that make both of these activities 
meaningful in the first place.  
 
Hence, the new movement in critical pedagogy prioritizes the ideational 
production of ‘critical hope’ as a motivational basis for transformative social 
action prior to and outside of concrete political or economic struggle, rather than 
beginning from it. Institutionalized critical education has become a project less in 
the service of particular political struggles and more an attempt to resist the 
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closure, privatization, apathy, and psycho-emotional ‘coldness’ that is presumed 
to abort political struggle at its immediate roots of subjective experience. Writing 
in defence of higher education as a key site of cultural resistance, Giroux argued 
that critical pedagogy is no longer simply a matter of ‘raising consciousness’ 
about the possibilities for realistic opposition, but a question of educating people 
to believe that these possibilities are worthwhile in the first place (1997: 28). This 
type of educational practice moves beyond cognitive rationality and towards the 
psychological, emotional and ethical experiences through which it is mediated. 
The question here is not only what makes it possible for people to rationally 
formulate alternatives to existing conditions, but also what makes it possible for 
them to want to do so. This reflects a turn away from the duality of ‘reason and 
freedom’ towards a more complex theory of social agency that includes its ‘more-
than-rational’ and ‘less-than-rational’ dimensions (or in other words, the ‘pre-
theoretical’ and ‘extramundane’ elements) of human action, as well as the social 
and emotional foundations of inter-subjective ethics (Ahmed 2004; Anderson 
2006; Anderson and Harrison 2006).  
 
In other words, contemporary critical educators are trying to produce through 
pedagogy a condition which, according to Honneth, is presumed to have been lost 
in the mid-twentieth century and yet which critical theory requires for its own 
justification: an innate, essential and indomitable need for personal and social 
transformation. This presents a familiar dilemma: ‘how can we imagine these new 
concepts even arising here and now in living beings if the entire society is against 
such an emergence of new needs?’ (Marcuse 1970: 76). Or, in the words of C. 
Wright Mills, we seem to have two choices when theorizing need and desire. On 
the one hand, he wrote, ‘if we take the simple democratic view that what men 
[sic] are interested in is all that concerns us, then we are accepting the values 
that have been inculcated, often accidentally and often deliberately’. On the other 
hand, ‘if we take the dogmatic view that what is to men’s interests, whether they 
are interested in it or not, is all that need concern us morally, then we run the 
risk of violating democratic values’ (Mills 1959: 194). In his habitually accessible 
way, Mills expressed the stubborn tension between socially constituted need as-
it-appears or is experienced, on the one hand, and universal norms of need that 
may be abstracted from or alien to lived experience, on the other. It is this 
unhappy no-choice between the reification of immediate particular experience and 
the authoritarian imposition of abstract generality that critical theory must aim to 
transcend. 
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Before illustrating more specifically how this is being negotiated in movements for 
critical education, however, it is important to explain the critical diagnosis of 
society that frames and directs this movement. It is also important to understand 
how it is positioned within the broader theoretical project which explains how the 
dialectical relationships between social structure and individual subjectivity both 
reproduce and interrupt political domination. The next section of this essay is 
therefore devoted to explaining the thesis that a ‘crisis of hope’ has paralyzed 
political agency and social movements in post-modern capitalist societies, and 
that the geographical and ideological expansion of capital threatens to globalize 
both forces of dehumanisation and a pathological one-dimensionality of inter-
subjective consciousness.  
 
Post-modern capitalism – the ‘end of social dreams’? 
 
‘What is crippling is not the presence of an enemy but rather the 
universal belief, not only that this tendency is irreversible, but that 
the historic alternatives to capitalism have been proven unviable 
and impossible, and that no other socio-economic system is 
conceivable, let alone practicable.’ (Jameson 2005: xii) 
 
There are a range of theories now circulating to characterize this condition, many 
of which take the form of ‘social pathologies’. I borrow the term ‘pathology’ from 
Axel Honneth to denote a specific genre of analysis which is not simply a critique 
of particular social problems (such as, for example, the decline of organized Left 
politics or the rise of privatized consumer cultures), but which rather aims to 
provide a general account of systemic ‘misdevelopments’ in individual and social 
character (Honneth 2007: 4).6 Although this approach to social analysis is often 
considered central to critical theory but antithetical to post-structuralist 
epistemologies, I would argue that in fact the rhetorical delineation of ‘normal’ 
from ‘abnormal’ phenomena is a foundational, if often latent or repressed 
condition for any critique, including that which has as its target the construction 
of such boundaries themselves.7 Such accounts are by definition grounded in 
                                                 
6 For an earlier consideration of the notion of social ‘pathology’, particularly as regards the 
relationship between ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ in processes of modern rationalisation, see 
Habermas (1987). 
 
7 It is interesting that Michel Foucault, whose work has arguably been most fundamental to 
dismantling the construction of deviance and normality, had very clear ideas about such 
boundaries in his own intellectual and political work. During a debate with Noam Chomsky, 
when asked ‘which malady contemporary society is most afflicted’, Foucault answered, ‘I 
would say that our society has been afflicted by a disease, a very curious, a very 
paradoxical disease, for which we haven’t yet found a name; and this mental disease has a 
very curious symptom, which is that the symptom itself brought the mental disease into 
being’ (Elders 1971/2006: 59). 
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normative assumptions about truth, right and human nature. Honneth explains 
that ‘if we claim that a society’s characteristic desires or interests have taken a 
wrong turn, or if we problematize the mechanisms by which they are generated, 
then we are implicitly defending the thesis that a given set of social relations has 
violated the conditions which constitute a necessary presupposition for the good 
life’ (2007: 56).  
 
In this case, the preconditions for the ‘good life’ include hope and the need or 
desire for transcendence and freedom; the social relations violating these 
conditions are the relations of neo-liberal capitalism.8 The hypothesis is that it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to counter the deleterious effects of capitalism 
because its relations of production and cultural practices not only disable the 
critical imagination of alternatives and the organization of collective action, but 
also produce types of human beings for whom these practices are subjectively 
and objectively meaningless. The empirical evidence for this, it is argued, is that 
utopia – as a genre, a project and a form of anticipatory knowledge – is either 
vanishing from public culture, or (less often) already extinct. This is said to 
signify the structural preclusion of hope, which has long been considered an 
innate motivational resource for individual and collective agency in democratic 
participation, progressive politics and social revolution (Smith 2005).9  
 
It has become relatively commonplace to speak about the ‘crisis of hope’ as an 
actually existing and generalized social condition to be observed, described and 
acted upon. In the early 1980s, for example, Jürgen Habermas spoke of the 
‘exhaustion of utopian energies’ associated with the legitimation crisis of the 
welfare state and the declining importance and possibility of the emancipatory 
potential of non-alienated social labour in late capitalist societies (Habermas 
1989).10 Two decades on, Frederic Jameson has argued that there continues to be 
                                                                                                                                            
  
8 David Harvey defines neo-liberalism as ‘in the first instance a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade’ (2007: 2). 
However, it has been clear for some time that while the term ‘neo-liberalism’ was initially 
used to describe a specific economic ideology it has come to mean something entirely 
more complex.  
 
9  For a useful and provocative typology of different ‘modes of hoping’ (including ‘patient, 
critical, estimative, resolute and utopian’ forms of hope), see Webb (2007a). 
 
10 For an interesting discussion of the relationship between Habermas’ analysis and more 
recent diagnoses of a ‘crisis of hope’, see Browne (2005). 
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a powerful anti-utopian tendency or even ‘revolt against utopia’ in intellectual and 
political life, and that the ‘waning of the utopian idea is a fundamental historical 
and political symptom, which deserves diagnosis in its own right’ (Jameson 2004: 
41, 36).11 Zygmunt Bauman paints a slightly different version of this ‘crisis’, 
arguing that while ‘utopia will never die because humans cannot and will not stop 
hoping’, we nevertheless inhabit a ‘post-utopian’ society in which it has become 
necessary to symbolically defend the very value of hope before one can set about 
discussing it (2004).12 Indeed, in the post-Soviet period serious charges have 
been levied against utopianism, namely, that it is an inverted form of 
totalitarianism. The neoconservative Right equate ‘utopianism’ with Stalinist-style 
and fundamentalist politics, while the anti-authoritarian and post-modern Left 
define it as an ontological offence to difference and complexity13 – and in much 
critical theory, utopia has the neurotic privilege of being both imperative and 
desirable and impossible and dangerous.14 According to Bauman, this 
delegitimation of utopianism from both left and right creates a sense that there 
are ‘no visible bridges’ left to a better society and no collective will to cross any 
that might be built (Jacobsen and Tester 2007: 309).15 In a recently published 
collection of interviews about hope with intellectuals and cultural workers, Mary 
Zournazi similarly concludes that ‘we live in a world where our belief, faith and 
trust in political or individual actions are increasingly being threatened, leading to 
despair and uncertainty’ (2002: 14). In more public space, Anthony Giddens 
recently issued a ‘call to arms’ in the British left-of-centre newspaper The 
Guardian, claiming that ‘there are no longer utopian projects that would supply a 
source of direction for social reform and a source of motivating ideas’ (2006). 
                                                 
11 Jameson (2004: 41, fn. 4) defines anti-utopia as ‘the expression of the fiercely anti-
utopian and anti-revolutionary ideology for which utopias inevitably lead to repression and 
dictatorship, to conformity and boredom’.  
 
12 It is significant to note that he made a similar argument to explain the more specific 
decline of socialist politics three decades ago (Bauman 1976), and that Habermas long ago 
recognised historical struggles to rehabilitate the idea of ‘utopia’ as a ‘legitimate medium 
for depicting alternative life possibilities that are seen as inherent in the historical process 
itself’ (1989: 50). 
 
13 See, e.g., Gray 2007 as an example of conservative anti-utopianism, and Daniel and 
Moylan (1997), Jameson (2005) and Levitas (2005) for critical discussions of this 
tendency.  
 
14 See especially Whitebook’s Perversion and Utopia (1996). I am grateful to Harry Dahms 
for this pointing me towards this work.  
  
15 Bauman argues that this distinguishes us from Marx, whom he claims was convinced 
that large-scale, revolutionary, top-down social change was imminent and desirable in his 
lifetime. However, as illustrated above, Marx’s earlier writing suggests that prior to 1848 
he himself was doubtful about the nature and possibility of revolutionary agency within 
German and wider European societies (Marx 1843). 
 
Sarah S. Amsler 11 
 
This diagnosis takes on more dystopian dimensions as well, with writers 
announcing the ‘celebration of the end of social dreams’ (Dinerstein and Neary 
quoted in McLaren 2001: 117) and lamenting the decline of societies where 
individuals ‘sleepwalk’ through utterly dominated lives, having only nightmares 
about impossibly determined futures or living in deluded, mediated fantasies 
(Weiler 2003). Writing from Britain, Dinerstein and Neary suggest that in our 
everyday lives as well as in more formal theory-work we stand against projects of 
systematic ‘disutopia’ (1999).16 In its most radical versions, such work sketches 
out a dystopian future where Max Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of capitalist rationality is 
locked from within and where capabilities of emancipatory reason are quite 
literally educated out of human nature (Beck 2002). These extreme forms of 
hopelessness and anti-hope are linked directly to the dangerous excesses of post-
modern capitalism (Ainley and Canaan 2005; Giroux 2004; McLaren 2001), and 
the prognosis is sometimes apocalyptic.17 Indeed, spectres of authoritarianism 
and (proto)fascism are again being pronounced on the politico-pedagogical 
landscape, and the classical work of first and second-generation critical theorists 
is being rehabilitated as attention returns once again to explaining and 
idealistically combating the subtle, complicated mechanisms of subjective 
domination in contemporary society. 
 
Some theorists, such as Frederic Jameson, argue that this trend towards 
‘disutopia’ is a consequence of material injustice and symptomatic of a form of 
‘globalization’ which segregates the world’s populations into equally anti-utopian 
halves: 
 
In one of these worlds, the disintegration of the social is so 
absolute—misery, poverty, unemployment, starvation, squalor, 
violence and death—that the intricately elaborated social schemes 
of utopian thinkers become as frivolous as they are irrelevant. In 
the other, unparalleled wealth, computerized production, scientific 
and medical discoveries unimaginable a century ago as well as an 
endless variety of commercial and cultural pleasures, seem to have 
rendered utopian fantasy and speculation as boring and antiquated 
as pre-technological narratives of space flight (Jameson 2005). 
 
                                                 
16 ‘Disutopia’ refers not simply to the broader ‘waning of utopia’ often discussed, but is 
based on a specific theory of the ‘subsumption of concrete labour by abstract labour’ 
(Allman et al. 2000: 16). 
 
17 See, for example, Gray’s (2003) ‘dire warning’ for intellectual life and Giroux’s (2004) 
Terror of Neoliberalism: Authoritarianism and the eclipse of democracy.  
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Here, ‘possibility’ and fate are understood not as inherent features of human 
nature, but as Mills once argued, as ‘feature[s] of an historically specific kind of 
social structure’ (1959: 183) or unmediated subjective expressions of structural 
power relations. While Jameson himself has long defended the value of utopian 
imaginaries, he also asserts that these are only meaningful or indeed possible 
within certain socio-historical and cultural arrangements (Jameson 2005).  
 
In addition to such concerns about inequality and exploitation, however, there is 
considerable concern about changes in the culture(s) of post-modern capitalism, 
particularly those that disable democratic sociation and critical thought. These 
anxieties are expressed in the traditional vocabulary of the political Left, and 
include the privatization and commercialization of public life, the disarticulation of 
‘the social’ and collective social responsibility, the censorship and enclosure of 
democratic cultures and relatively autonomous public spheres, the decline of 
sustained social movements, the rise of cultural authoritarianism and societies of 
control, the empowerment of new, aggressive forms of military and cultural 
imperialism, the commercialization of culture and identity, and the drift in 
democratic societies towards more authoritarian forms of political and ideological 
control (Bauman 2004; Coté et al. 2007; Giddens 2006; Giroux 2004, 2007; 
Habermas 1999; Harvey 2005; Jameson 2005; McLaren 2002; Sennett 1998). 
This constellation of related phenomena is widely (and I think largely 
inaccurately) referred to simply as ‘neo-liberal capitalism’, and each of these 
conditions is said to contribute to what Brazilian educator and activist Paulo Freire 
once described as the ‘inflexible negation of the right to dream differently, to 
dream of utopia’ (2001: 22).  
 
Freire’s use of the term ‘right’ is telling, for his judgment is based on a first 
principle that human beings possess a natural (or at least historically regular) 
‘utopian impulse’; a longing to be that is unjustly, albeit often unconsciously, 
suppressed or unlearned within this social order. Such assertions are, on the one 
hand, anthropological and essentialist. Zygmunt Bauman (2004), for example, 
argues that ‘to hope is to be human’; Darren Webb recently claimed that hope is 
a ‘human universal that can be experienced in different modes’ (2007: 65); and 
Freire (1998: 69) concluded even more bluntly that ‘the absence of hope is not 
the “normal” way to be human. It is a distortion.’ However, appeals to the 
anthropological normality of hope and the deviant nature of its suppression are 
also existentialist insofar as they assume that ‘revolt, need, hope, rejection and 
desire’ are socially constituted and that they emerge from inter-subjective 
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experience within particular historical conditions (de Beauvoir 1948). From this 
unconventional combination of humanist essentialism and existentialist 
philosophy emerges a hypothesis that some of the most powerful, empirically 
existing intellectual and emotional resources of resistance to dehumanization that 
have been available to past generations – namely, utopian imaginaries and the 
ethical will and capability to conceptualize alternative ways of being – have 
themselves been materially transformed.18  
 
The ‘root-of-all-evil’ diagnosis19 in this narrative of social decline is the loss of the 
human capacity or will to desire hope itself, either because individuals have lost 
the ability or desire to imagine alternative ways of being (i.e., an erosion of both 
critical and anticipatory forms of consciousness) or because they are deprived of 
the structural possibilities of agency that this will had heretofore been rooted in.20 
These arguments are theoretically significant because they go beyond tactical 
critiques of particular social problems and suggest pathological changes in the 
quality and total way of being in post-modern capitalist societies. The present 
‘crisis of hope’ is regarded as a materially-based distortion of subjective human 
development. In other words, the question is no longer whether certain social 
arrangements are possible or debating their desirability, but rather whether the 
entire organization of the social environment disables people from developing the 
psychological and emotional desire for personal transcendence or social change, 
and prevents them from developing the inter-subjective empathy and compassion 
that would allow them to identify with the suffering of others. We suspect we may 
be losing or have lost, not only as Adorno once put it, ‘the capacity to imagine the 
totality as something entirely different’ (quoted in Daniel and Moylan 1997: vii), 
but in some cases the deeper desire to do so, and in other cases, where given 
reality seems impenetrable, the will to even try. This, the reification of 
impossibility, is the contemporary crisis of hope – not simply a shift in ways of 
knowing or enacting society, but as C. Wright Mills once wrote, a concern about 
                                                 
18 Darren Webb makes a similar observation, identifying two ‘contrasting perspectives’ on 
hope, one that understands it as an essential feature of human existence and another that 
views it as a social construction. He proposes a ‘more nuanced’ approach that would 
understand hope as ‘both biologically rooted and socially constructed’ (2007: 67). 
  
19 This phrase is used by both Frederic Jameson and Gustavo Gutierrez. 
 
20 However, we must here recall the situated nature of utopian diagnoses, for as Jameson 
points out, ‘their root-of-all-evil diagnosis…will also reflect a specific class-historical 
standpoint or perspective’ (2004: 47). Similarly, Honneth reminds us that ‘what 
constitutes the standard according to which social pathologies are evaluated is an ethical 
conception of social normality tailored to conditions that enable human self-realization’ 
(2007: 36). 
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‘pervasive transformations of the very “nature” of man [sic] and the conditions 
and aims of his life’ (1959: 13).    
 
Need, desire and hope in critical theory 
 
There is hence an enormous urgency about much of the literature on ‘critical 
hope’. However, it is neither unprecedented nor unusual for critical theorists to be 
occupied with identifying and monitoring forces of dehumanization within 
capitalist societies. Nor is post-modern capitalism the first social order to threaten 
‘critical hope’ or to manipulate need and desire, and utopia has been ‘waning’ for 
quite a prolonged while (Kumar 1987; Milojevic 2003).21 The over-arching 
analytical framework is so familiar, in fact, that it often seems either woefully 
unoriginal or indicative of a remarkable historical continuity which makes the 
critical analyses of mid-twentieth century societies prescient for our own (James 
2006).22 What is relatively new, however, is the particular interest in 
rehabilitating hope, utopia, need and desire as mainstream categories of critical 
analysis. The classical works of Karl Marx, Karl Mannheim, William Morris, Edward 
P. Thompson, Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno are increasingly being dusted off and re-excavated for 
insight into the empirical and normative foundations of these concepts.23 This 
project is long overdue, for despite the enduring inclination amongst first and 
second-generation critical theorists to suspect that there was something 
empirically indomitable and theoretically important about hope, the concept has 
been treated unevenly at best (Smith 2005). There are several notable 
exceptions: Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope (1959), Herbert Marcuse’s 
Revolution of Hope (1968) and ‘The end of utopia’ (1970), Walter Benjamin’s 
work on hope and history (1940; see also Gur-Ze’ev 1998), and passing 
                                                 
21 Consider, for example, Adorno’s much earlier comment that ‘nowadays the critique of 
utopia has sunk into the common ideological stockpile, while at the same time the triumph 
of technical productivity strives to maintain the illusion that utopia, incompatible with the 
relations of production, has already been realized within its realm’ (1968). 
 
22 Consider, for example, the epistemological relationship between Adorno’s essay on 
‘Education after Auschwitz’ (1968) and Giroux’s ‘Education after Abu Ghraib’ (2004). Does 
Adorno provide analytical tools for disclosing forces of domination and ‘dissolving the 
spells’ of cultural domination in post-modern capitalist society? Or do the normative 
principles and general categories of analysis of critical theory serve as rhetorical 
frameworks? What is the relationship between the Holocaust and the American ‘war on 
terror’? Is this a new phenomenon (and if so why do the classical theories seem so 
relevant) or is it a manifestation of a longer historical process that has been ongoing or 
that we see repeated in different times and places (and if so, why is it being interpreted as 
new)?  
 
23 See, for example, Anderson (2006), Daniel and Moylan (1997) and Gur-Ze’ev (1998). 
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references to hope and utopia in other writings. More recently, however, hope 
and utopia have re-emerged as organizing principles for entire theoretical 
projects: David Harvey’s Spaces of Hope (2000), Susan Buck-Morss’ Dreamworld 
and Catastrophe: The passing of mass utopia in East and West (2000), Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s Utopistics (1998), Frederic Jameson’s Archaeologies of the Future 
(2005) and Erik Olin Wright’s ‘Real Utopias Project’ (1991–present) being only a 
few obvious examples.  
 
A crucial question arises here: how should we interpret this intellectual and 
political migration towards hope and utopia, particularly given the long-standing 
‘theoretical aversion’ to hope in critical theory (Smith 2005)? Why, after three 
decades of deliberate movement away from both philosophical anthropology and 
normative universals, after the routinization of the post-modern and cultural 
turns, do we find renewed interest in hitherto marginalised (and often maligned) 
concepts of human nature, need, desire, will, hope and utopia?24 It has perhaps 
predictably been argued that this is simply an ideological expression of the more 
structural ‘dissipation of utopian energies’ in post-modern capitalist societies 
(Browne 2005; Sinnerbrink et al. 2005). In such interpretations hope is 
associated with compensatory ideology or naïve optimism, a foil to the 
transformative potential of ‘radical hopelessness’ or more goal-oriented critical 
utopias (Chopra 2004). When thus defined as diluted or disempowered 
utopianism, hope is interpreted as an unimaginative and cowardly reaction to the 
political and intellectual fragmentation of the Left, the implosion of grand 
narratives of historical agency, and the censorship or incorporation of all mass 
alternatives to neo-liberal capitalism. It is hence singled out from other 
extramundane concepts like justice, desire, memory and love as something 
particularly ‘amateurish’, ‘second-rate’, immature, and even ‘religious’ (Smith 
2005: 46-8; see also Levitas 2005: 171), and scholarly interest in utopianism 
stigmatized as ‘unscientific’ anachronism (Daniel and Moylan 1997).25 Indeed, E. 
P. Thompson once argued that the debate between ‘scientific’ and ‘utopian’ 
socialism in nineteenth-century Europe had shaped the entire architecture of 
thought about both Marxism and utopia in unfortunate ways. Referring to the 
essay ‘Socialism – utopian and scientific’ (Marx and Engels 1859: 68-111), 
Thompson quipped that we had been ‘running away from the acceptance of 
                                                 
24 This interest in need, desire and subjectivity also places these theorists in a particularly 
marginal position within the Marxist tradition (for more on this see Kellner 1997: 87). 
 
25 For an interesting discussion on the rise of the non-Marxist and post-Marxist left, see 
Therborn (2007). 
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utopianism as a valid imaginative form, because of a fright given to us by Engels 
in 1880’ (Thompson 1976: 101). Hence, although utopian vision is central to 
critical theory, the dominance of its more materialist and scientized orientations 
has institutionalized an anxiety that entertaining the utopian imagination is a 
shameful flight from ‘concrete politics’ into an inhibiting form of intellectual bad 
faith.26  
 
However, such critiques of the turn towards hope and utopia do little to aid its 
interpretation. Are these theories accurate diagnoses of a new, empirically 
existing form of ideologically-based determinism in post-modern capitalist 
societies; literally, the historical ‘end of social dreams’? Are they more accurately 
discourses which express the class-specific critiques of a disempowered and 
disappointed Left that is attempting to crack through the hegemony of neo-liberal 
‘utopias’ in a largely post-socialist world? Are new theories of hope and utopia 
enabled by the ‘affective turn’ in critical and cultural theory, which opens up 
greater opportunities to legitimately inquire into emotional aspects of social life 
and concepts such as respect, love, fear and desire? (Anderson and Harrison 
2006; Webb 2007) Or might they be interpreted as secular theodicies which seek 
to explain – again, still – how and why injustice, irrationality and inhumanity 
continue to be so legitimately executed in and by ostensibly ‘enlightened’, 
privileged, democratic and humane societies? 
 
I would like to argue that these factors constitute a familiar constellation that 
critical theorists have developed to explain the relationship between the material 
conditions of society, human subjectivity, and the possibilities for radical social 
                                                 
26 Here Thompson refers to Marx’s and Engels’ critique of ‘utopian socialism’ as 
represented by ‘idealists’ such as Robert Owen and Charles Fourier (see Levitas 2005: 6-7; 
Jameson 2005: xii). It is important to note that Engels the situated nature of their work 
(which he also admired). Each version of socialism claimed to be the ‘expression of 
absolute truth, reason and justice, [which] has only to be discovered [accidentally] to 
conquer all the world by virtue of its own power’. In addition, he argued, ‘as each one’s 
special kind of absolute truth, reason, and justice is again conditioned by his subjective 
understanding, his conditions of existence, the measure of his knowledge and his 
intellectual training, there is no other ending possible in this conflict of absolute truths than 
that they shall be mutually exclusive of one another.’ In other words, in much the same 
way as Karl Mannheim regarded competing political ideologies as a crisis of truth, Engels 
regarded intellectual and political pluralism as the source of a ‘mish-mash’ type of 
socialism. He argued that this conditionality should be done away with; that what was 
needed was a science of socialism that was placed on a ‘real basis’. He argued that history, 
politics and anticipatory vision should be not metaphysical but economic, rooted in class 
struggle and understood dialectically. For Engels, the difference between utopian and 
scientific socialism was that the first attempted to ‘manufacture a system of society as 
perfect as possible’ while the second aimed to ‘examine the historico-economic succession 
of events from which these classes and their antagonism had of necessity sprung, and to 
discover in the economic conditions thus created the means of ending the conflict’.  
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transformation. It combines philosophical anthropology (i.e., philosophies of 
‘human nature’), socialist politics, theories linking individual subjectivity to socio-
economic structure, and normative commitment to (variably defined) values of 
freedom, justice, truth and right. Interpreted within this framework, the ‘crisis of 
hope’ can neither be reduced to a world-historical threat to human nature nor 
explained as an epiphenomenal ‘shift in critical reflections on late modernity from 
the possibility of utopia to the problem of hope’ (Browne 2005). I would suggest 
that it rather constitutes a new version of a familiar and paradoxical ‘social 
pathology’: that a fundamental crisis of critical, anticipatory consciousness has 
emerged from the relations of production of post-modern capitalism, and that this 
phenomenon threatens to make impossible the subjective possibilities for their 
material transformation. At the same time, developments in post-modern critical 
theory – many of which also emerge from these same relations – enable us to 
take the analysis of this paradoxical situation even further than classical critical 
theorists ever could. A number of unresolved theoretical problematics are hence 
productively re-opened, including the ontological nature of anticipatory 
knowledge, the role of ideas and ideologies in motivating social action, and the 
social constitution of human need and desire that motivate different ‘modes of 
hoping’ in the first place.27  
 
Classical roots of critical–utopian education 
 
This is one reason that critical educators have turned to classical critical theories 
as inspiration for analyzing and resisting subjective dehumanization within post-
modern capitalism. Four first and second-generation theorists – Ernst Bloch, Erich 
Fromm, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno – now appear prominently in 
critical educational theory to inform questions of how need and desire are 
constituted within particular social systems, and how they might be radically 
reconstituted within the same. While they disagreed about the relationships 
between critique and utopia and pedagogy and politics, as well as about the 
ontological nature of human need and desire, all ultimately argued that political 
movements for radical freedom must include a subjective process of critical-
utopian education. 
 
Ernst Bloch’s work, for example has been invoked by educators to theorize the 
notion of ‘critical hope’, defined as the ‘desire for a better way of living expressed 
                                                 
27 For more on ‘modes of hoping’ see Webb (2007). 
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in the description of a different kind of society that makes possible that 
alternative way of life’ (Levitas 1993: 257). Such hope is also regarded as a form 
of ‘militant utopianism’ that ‘pluralizes politics by generating dissent against the 
claims of a false hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism and authoritarian social 
values (Giroux 2003: 477). Bloch understood hope as an ontological fact: ‘not 
only a basic feature of human consciousness, but, concretely and correctly 
grasped, a basic determination within objective reality as a whole’ (Bloch 1985: 
7). His philosophy of hope is balanced, rather precariously, inside the unresolved 
tension between human nature and social contingency. On the one hand, Bloch 
assumed that expectation, desire, ‘thinking-forward’ and thinking-better are 
inherently human properties. As Douglas Kellner argues, ‘Bloch always begins 
with the wishing, hopeful, needy, and hungry human being and analyzes what 
prohibits realization of human desire and fulfilment of human needs’ (1997: 87). 
On the other hand, however, the hope instinct is not simply biological. Bloch was 
critical of hypotheses that our ‘natural’ behaviours – including self-preservation – 
can be explained as unconscious drives (Bloch 1985: 77-64). ‘All definitions of 
basic drives’, he argued, ‘only flourish in the soil of their own time and are limited 
to that time…[they] cannot be made absolute, even less separated from the 
economic being of mankind in each age’ (Bloch 1985: 69). 
 
Thus on the one hand, Bloch argued that as a species we require hope; 
‘hopelessness is itself, in a temporal and factual sense, the most insupportable 
thing, downright intolerable to human needs’ (Bloch 2005: 5). On the other hand, 
if hope proceeds ‘uneducated’, without guidance about how to  formulate 
‘informed discontent’, the desire to know what is In-Front-of-Us can turn into a 
dangerously abstract form of fantasy which Bloch calls ‘fraudulent hope’ (i.e., 
ideology). We must therefore learn how to hope ‘correctly’; to ‘think beyond’ in 
forms of ‘educated hope’ (docta spes) or ‘concrete utopia’, rather than merely 
‘wishful thinking’. For Bloch, therefore, the proper method and objective of 
education was the critical hermeneutics of everyday life. We must learn to read 
past and present society not for what it is but for what it once intended to be, 
seeking out the ‘utopian residue or surplus that can be used for social critique 
and to advance progressive politics’ (Kellner 1997: 82). As Kellner puts it, Bloch 
offers a form of cultural ideology critique that ‘is not merely unmasking 
(Entlarvung) but is also uncovering and discovery: revelations of unrealized 
dreams, lost possibilities, abortive hopes that can be resurrected, enlivened and 
realized in our current situation’ (1997: 84). 
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While Bloch does not make reference to ‘true’ or ‘false’ possibilities, he made 
clear in his work that only educated, concrete intimations towards socialism were 
to be considered adequate forms of resistance to forces of exploitation, alienation 
and oppression (Kellner 1997: 94). His teleological conception of hope is 
exemplified by a passage from one of Karl Marx’s early letters to Arnold Ruge, 
which Bloch refers to repeatedly in The Principle of Hope: 
 
Our motto must therefore be; reform of consciousness not through 
dogmas but through the analysis of mystical consciousness which is 
still unclear to itself. It will then become apparent that the world 
has long possessed the dream of a matter, of which it must only 
possess the consciousness in order to possess it in reality. It will 
become apparent that it is not a question of the great thought-dash 
between past and future, but of the carrying through of the 
thoughts of the past. (Marx 1843; also in Levitas 1997: 69) 
 
The need for this movement – for following a ‘red arrow’ of socialist movement 
through historical progress – was empirically factual for Bloch, evident in the way 
that ‘succeeding ages “re-function” the material of the past to suit their 
ideological requirements’. Although only some of these projects could be 
considered progressive, he believed that ‘from all progressive thinking a utopian 
surplus is carried over into the future’ (Plaice et al. 1995: xxvii). This latent 
potentiality has only to be uncovered and revealed, in all societies at all times, in 
order to be consciously realized.  
 
Although Bloch’s theory of ‘educated hope’ is extremely relevant for theorizing 
pedagogical contributions to struggles for human freedom, his deep commitment 
to a particular vision of socialism as the teleological culmination of all human 
dreams, wishes, hopes and desires was not fully shared by other critical theorists. 
To Have or To Be? (1976), for example, challenged this asymmetry by arguing 
that both actually-existing capitalism and actually-existing socialism were 
modernist distortions of human hope. The ‘Great Promise of Unlimited Progress’, 
as Fromm called it, was founded on two main principles: hedonism and egoism 
(i.e., the obsessive pursuit of individual pleasure). He argued that both were 
believed to be dominant elements of ‘human nature’, but the irony was that this 
ideologically-based belief constituted a threat to human existence itself. What 
could be more abnormal, he asked, more ‘pathogenic’ than a collective desire for 
a way of life that was ultimately its own negation? (Fromm 1976: 19) In other 
words, Fromm argued that the very acts of hoping, needing and desiring within 
advanced industrial societies must be defined as ideological practices of 
subjective domination. Like Bloch, he believed that under ‘normal’ conditions 
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‘human beings have an inherent and deeply rooted desire to be: to express our 
faculties, to be active, to be related to others, to escape the prison cell of 
selfishness’ (1976: 103).28 The desire for freedom and transcendence, while it 
might be repressed, could thus never actually cease to be a potentiality (2001: 
247).  
 
However, Fromm believed that the human character also has the potential to be 
shaped otherwise by the socio-economic system that requires it (Rickert 1986: 
360). He therefore inquired into the nature of desire itself – its deformity, rather 
than its formation. Like many of his contemporaries, he was particularly 
interested in explaining why ‘the strongest of all instincts, that for survival, seems 
to ceased to have motivate us’ to make radical changes in the way we live (1976: 
19). He posited a number of hypotheses: the emptying and technocracization of 
politics; social atomization and egoistic action; collective fear of radical change; 
and ‘the view that we have no alternatives to the models of corporate capitalism, 
social democratic or Soviet socialism, or “technocratic fascism with a smiling 
face”’ (1976: 20). Ultimately, Fromm’s solution to combat this tendency was 
pedagogical. To restore the normality of human desire to realize unlimited 
potentials, it would be necessary to produce a ‘radical change of the human heart’ 
as well as effecting ‘drastic economic and social changes…that give the human 
heart the chance for change and the courage and vision to achieve it’ (1976: 
19).29 This, he argued, would be an essentially ‘educational process’ of change 
(ibid. 173).  
 
For Herbert Marcuse, the relationship between subjective and objective change 
was more problematic. He described capitalist domination as a ‘counter-revolution 
anchored in the instinctual structure’ of individuals (1971: 21), and argued that 
                                                 
28 For more about Fromm’s psycho-social theory of human need and desire, see John 
Rickert’s (1986) excellent discussion of Escape from Freedom (1941/1994), Man for 
Himself (1947/2003) and The Sane Society (1955/2001), as well as numerous of Fromm’s 
essays. 
 
29 As an example of the mutually dependent relationship between ideational and material 
change might work, he offered the example of consumption. ‘Sane consumption’, or 
patterns of consumption that did not destroy either human beings or their environments, 
could not be forced upon people. ‘To force citizens to consume what the state decides is 
best – even if it is the best – is out of the question. Bureaucratic control that would forcibly 
block consumption would only make people all the more consumption hungry. Sane 
consumption can only take place if an ever-increasing number of people want to change 
their consumption patterns and their lifestyles. And this is possible only if people are 
offered a type of consumption that is more attractive than the one they are used to. This 
cannot happen overnight or by decree, but will require a slow educational process, and in 
this the government must play an important role.’ (Fromm 1976: 173) 
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its transformation demanded a ‘radical transvaluation of values’ (Marcuse 1971: 
15).  
 
A society constantly re-creates, this side of consciousness and 
ideology, patters of behaviour and aspiration as part of the 
“nature” of its people, and unless the revolt reaches into this 
“second” nature, into these ingrown patterns, social change will 
remain incomplete, even self-defeating. (Marcuse 1971: 20; see 
also 1964: 4-5). 
 
Because Marcuse believed that political injustices were internalized into the deep 
psychological structures of individuals – and that the potential for radical 
resistance was also instinctually rooted (Rickert 1986: 368) – he placed deep 
subjectivity at the heart of social change. The creation of ‘true’ needs would 
motivate new types of political action towards a non-aggressive, non-alienating, 
non-oppressive society. For Marcuse, there was one obvious and empirically 
verifiable category of ‘false’ needs in any society: needs that ‘perpetuate toil, 
aggressiveness, misery and injustice’ – not only for oneself, but also for the 
others upon which our ‘happiness’ may depend (1964: 5). These needs can and 
must be resisted and unlearned, for ‘we find ourselves up against a 
system…whose internal contradictions repeatedly manifest themselves in 
inhuman and unnecessary wars and whose growing productivity is growing 
destruction and growing waste’ (Marcuse 1970a: 108).30  
 
Throughout his work, Marcuse therefore criticized the ‘socially engineered arrest 
of consciousness’ in highly industrialized societies where ‘capitalist progress….not 
only reduces the environment of freedom, the “open space” of the human 
existence, but also the “longing”, the need for such an environment’ (1969: 25-
26). Under such conditions, alternatives to existing reality through either critique 
or utopian imagination become irrelevant because they do not correspond to 
individuals’ needs and desires, which are synonymous with those of the dominant 
system (Marcuse 1969: 82, 1970; see also Lodziak 2005). Hence, for Marcuse, 
radical pedagogy was central to a cultural revolution that prioritized the 
transformation of instinctual needs themselves. He advocated not only ‘liberating 
the consciousness of…realizable possibilities’, but also argued that cultural 
revolutionaries should ‘work on the development of consciousness’ (Marcuse 
                                                 
30 This quote continues: ‘Such a system is not immune. It is already defending itself 
against opposition, even that of intellectuals, in all corners of the world. And even if we see 
no transformation, we must fight on. We must resist if we still want to live as human 
beings, to work and be happy. In alliance with the system we can no longer do so.’  
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1970: 74), on creating a ‘new sensibility’ at the level of ‘second nature’ or 
‘socialized instinct’ (Marcuse 1969: 21), and on ‘transforming the will itself so 
that people no longer want what they want now’ (Marcuse 1970: 77). He argued 
that ‘morality is not necessarily and not primarily ideological. In the face of an 
amoral society, it becomes a political weapon’ (Marcuse 1969: 8).  
 
Theodor Adorno also addressed the cultural formation of needs, desires and 
values and envisioned a strong role for education in this process, while remaining 
perpetually critical of the role that formal education played in shaping anti-
democratic attitudes and relationships. In ‘Education after Auschwitz’, for 
example, he asserted that the deliberate formation of subjective human 
psychology was the only legitimate defence against an insurgent ‘barbarism 
[which] is inscribed within the principle of civilization’ (1967: 1). Here he parts 
company with Bloch, Fromm and Marcuse, whose theories assumed that 
education was ultimately a corrective practice which aimed to restore some state 
of normality against the pathological pedagogies of late-modern capitalism. For 
Adorno (1967), the problem was darker: Auschwitz, the Armenian genocide, the 
dropping of atomic bombs – these were not anomalous events but rather 
‘expressions of an extremely powerful societal tendency’ towards dehumanization 
that is an ever-present potentiality within human beings, emboldened under 
some conditions and repressed in others. He argued that traditional educational 
practices –  in schools, but also the more widespread pedagogies of mass culture 
– produced individuals who were psychologically ‘cold’: unable to love others, and 
unable to relate to others’ suffering or their desires.31  
 
Adorno agreed with Fromm and Marcuse it would be an authoritarian irony to 
‘force’ people to love, and that there was thus no reason to ‘appeal to eternal 
values, at which the very people who are prone to commit such atrocities would 
merely shrug their shoulders’. Neither did he see any point in attempting to 
humanize victims or ‘enlighten’ persecutors ‘about the positive qualities 
possessed by persecuted minorities’ (Adorno 1967: 2). Instead, he argued, 
critical education must attempt to elicit the need for love within individuals who 
do not experience it through a process of critical self-reflection, and the capability 
for civic ‘maturity’ (Adorno and Becker 1991). Indeed, despite Adorno’s deep 
ambivalence about the promises of enlightenment and rational knowledge, he 
                                                 
31 ‘The inability to identify with others was unquestionably the most important psycho-
logical condition for the fact that something like Auschwitz could have occurred in the 
midst of more or less civilized and innocent people.’ (Adorno 1967: 8) 
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argued that while barbarism could not be eradicated solely through subjective 
change, ‘education and enlightenment can still manage a little something’ in the 
perpetual struggle against it (Adorno 1967: 10). ‘If anything can help against 
coldness as the condition for disaster’, he wrote, ‘then it is the insight into the 
conditions that determine it and the attempt to combat those conditions, initially 
in the domain of the individual’ (1967: 9). 
 
These classical examples illustrate that the concepts of need, desire and hope 
have been central to critical theory, and that they have been intricately connected 
to cultural and pedagogical practices. However, instead of being considered useful 
analytical categories, they are regarded as embarrassing reminders of more 
‘naïve’ explanations of the relationship between individual subjectivities and social 
forces. The arrogation that ‘theorists’ might be able to distinguish universal ‘true 
needs’ from ‘false needs’ through rational critical analysis has been challenged by 
the insight that these normative judgments are themselves socially situated. It is 
argued that questions of ‘need’ and ‘desire’ must instead be dealt with 
existentially and empirically, or indeed, that we must abandon them entirely. 
There have thus been attempts to make this an anti-metaphysical and empirical 
problem. Browne, for example, describes critical theory as combining ‘utopian 
projections with the explication of the needs of subjects that are unfulfilled and 
the empirical analysis of the developmental tendencies of capitalist society’, not a 
method to ‘juxtapose an ideal state against existing conditions of oppression and 
inequality’. It is, in this definition, a ‘synthesis of normative and empirical analysis 
to disclose change in the present that prefigure an emancipated or democratic 
society’ (Browne 2005: 65). In another example, Honneth, suggests that we can 
observe context-dependent manifestations of ‘need’ and ‘desire’ in instances 
where ‘human subjects are denied the recognition they feel they deserve’; in 
other words, in ‘such moral experiences as feelings of social disrespect’ (Honneth 
2007: 71). In this case, we are no longer responsible for attributing ‘true’ and 
‘false’ needs to individuals or for assuming that people share some collective 
experience of desire for transcendence that is impeded by particular social 
conditions. Instead, if we assume only that all human beings have a ‘pre-
theoretical’ need for recognition, we need only be responsible for identifying 
instances in which this need is unfulfilled and then ‘reveal the socio-structural 
causes responsible for a distortion of the social framework of recognition in each 
particular case’ (Honneth 2007: 74). While we can not use this approach to 
distinguish between universally legitimate or ‘natural’ needs and desires and 
‘distorted’ forms that have been imposed or constructed by social forces, we can 
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at least verify the existence of a ‘pre-theoretical resource’ which alerts us to an 
incongruity between personal desire or expectation and the experience of social 
reality (2007: 77).  
 
For critical theorists who diagnose a systemic ‘crisis of hope’, however, these 
‘pre-theoretical’ needs that might alert individuals to the need for change are not 
immediately visible. In fact, the conspicuous absence of incongruity between 
personal needs, desires and hopes and systemic values and relationships is 
precisely the problem to be addressed. It is generally accepted that critical theory 
can no longer be considered an intellectual exposition of a ‘process of 
emancipation which is already under way’ amongst communities of struggle 
(Honneth 1997: 78). However, it is also not simply a question of how people who 
are ‘victimized, disrespected and ostracized’ might become able to articulate 
themselves in a democratic public sphere instead of ‘living out [their experiences] 
in a counterculture of violence’ (Honneth 2007: 78). Rather, it is a matter of 
trying to explain why a social system which seems empirically to proliferate 
relations of disrespect for human life and happiness does not result in cognitive or 
emotional dissonance, but rather ‘appeals to our intuitions and instincts, to our 
values and desires’ to the extent that it becomes ‘so embedded in common sense 
as to be taken for granted and not open for question’ (Harvey 2007: 5). It is a 
question of why we are lacking, in the words of Frederic Jameson, the ‘desire 
called utopia’ (2005) which constitutes the ultimate justification for any critical 
analysis of actually existing social reality, or of social reality as it is perceived and 
interpreted.  
 
From conscientization to the ‘education of desire’ 
 
The project of producing this desire is therefore now being interpreted as the 
primary task of education by critical pedagogues who subscribe to the ‘death of 
utopia’ pathology and who see the rehabilitation of utopian imagination on a 
grand scale as fundamental to the creation of alternatives to post-modern 
capitalism. The ‘education of desire’ is an analytical concept used to describe a 
particular thread of ideas within critical utopian socialist philosophy that 
emphasizes the centrality of ideational and ideological transformation in social 
change. E. P. Thompson (1976) borrowed the term from Miguel Abensour (1973), 
who wrote a now oft-cited article defending the value of utopianism in Marxist 
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critical thought.32 Abensour’s goal was to defend William Morris, an English writer 
and socialist activist whose utopian fiction and political lectures on hope were 
maligned by champions of ‘scientific socialism’ in the early twentieth century as 
overly ‘romantic’. Abensour argued that rather than attempting to rescue Morris 
(or any other utopian) from embarrassment by emphasizing his ‘scientific’ 
qualities, we must rather rescue the critical tradition from a form of sterilising 
scientized rationality which ignores the materiality of subjective factors such as 
emotion, need, desire and hope in radical social change. Long before the rise of 
‘sociology of emotions’, Abensour (and Thompson) asserted that problems of 
freedom, emancipation and transcendence cannot be understood solely through 
rational analysis (or analysis of rational action).  
 
Significantly, the meaning of ‘critical’ shifts slightly in the context of the education 
of desire. The dominant definition of ‘critical’ has historically referred to the 
taming or making ‘scientific’ of pre-existing needs, desires or longings for 
emancipation and change so that they did not become ideological, fanatical or un-
reflexive. This is the root stuff of ‘educated hope’ and ‘concrete utopia’; of 
learning to distinguish between fantasies of social change and more ‘realistic 
utopias’ that inform political practice. While the ‘critical’ prefix maintains this 
concern in the new context, it also prioritizes its more utopian and normative 
dimensions. In a world dominated  by ‘realism’, the aim of criticality is to create 
the desire or need for such values. Its goal is to produce alternative knowledge, 
values, emotions and identities as well as to educate rational critique. The 
‘education of desire’ hence departs from the science of consciousness-raising by 
recognizing the affective and imaginative conditions of social action – asserting, 
in other words, the merits of utopianism as a means of cultural transformation 
and resistance. It refers not only to the utopian practice of critical education, but 
also to the critical education of utopian imagination and desire. This practice is 
now being asserted as one of the most appropriate responses to the forces of 
‘disutopia’ in post-modern capitalist society.  
 
Contemporary critical theorists and educators rarely use the term ‘education of 
desire’. But they do speak frequently about things such as ‘raising ambitions, 
desires and real hope for those who wish to take seriously the issue of 
educational struggle and social justice’ (Burbules and Berk 1999: 51) and 
‘working with students to nurture…hunger for utopian social dreams’ (Canaan 
                                                 
32 Ruth Levitas elaborates a useful discussion of this in her essay on ‘the imaginary 
reconstitution of society’ (2005). 
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2007: 76).33 In assuming this task, however, educators find themselves in a 
paradoxical situation: they are often (though certainly not always) challenged, 
resisted and resented by the individuals and institutions they claim to want to 
‘emancipate’. In particular, student apathy about or resistance to critical 
pedagogy is regarded as a consequence of intellectual, political, ethical and 
existential colonization by the prevailing logic of power.34 In other words, critical 
educators interpret the absence of, denial of or indifference towards the ‘crisis of 
hope’ as symptomatic of the crisis itself.  
 
This tension – and it is a moral and political tension as well as a practical one – 
parallels the philosophical dilemma in contemporary critical theory: that ‘without 
some form of proof that its critical perspective is reinforced by a need or a 
movement within social reality’, critical theory (and critical pedagogy) loses its 
legitimacy (Honneth 2007: 66). In other words, in education as well as in theory, 
‘what is primarily disputed today is whether we can still consider useful a form of 
social criticism that owes its standards not to “immanent” ideas of the good or 
the just, but to “external” notions of value’ (Honneth 2007: 50). If we cannot 
locate justification for normative standards of truth and justice outside of what 
presently exists as knowable, and if we cannot arrogate value for any vision that 
is not universally and democratically shared by others, must the entire critical 
project come crashing down, leaving in its wake nothing but our immanent and 
imminent ‘reality’?  
 
Here critical pedagogy has something to offer critical theory, for this tension has 
become a problematic rather than a Thanatos. Many educators do not simply 
assume or accept that critical theory can remain legitimate only insofar as it can 
claim to ‘give a sociological account of the condition of the society’s state of 
consciousness or its  [empirically existing] desire for emancipation’ (Honneth 
1993/2007: 65). The political and moral imperatives of their own practice 
preclude this conclusion. Instead, they argue that we can use the theoretical tools 
of critique not only to reveal an innate need for freedom, but to create a need for 
the ‘pre-theoretical’ sources of emancipatory desire upon which critical knowledge 
                                                 
33 There are several excellent discussions of the difference between ‘moral education’, 
‘critical pedagogy’, ‘educated hope’ and the ‘education of desire’, and I hence do not want 
to reiterate them here. I would rather like to explain how new movements in critical 
education are embedded in longer critical traditions that address issues of need, desire, 
will and hope, and in the history of the ‘education of desire’. 
 
34 Joyce Canaan, for example, found that her ‘students were considering the active subject 
position that engaging in critical hope entails, yet found reasons for rejecting it, hardly 
surprising in the TINA [There Is No Alternative] logic era’ (2005: 89). 
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and transformative pedagogical practice are based (see also Browne 2005: 69). 
Discrepancies between social theory and the consciously lived experiences of 
individuals – elsewhere described as the ‘embarrassing fact’ that critical theory 
had lost its existential plausibility (Honneth 2007: 65) – are seen as the central 
challenge of education itself.35 From this perspective, the task of pedagogy is to 
resolve the paradox of the ‘one-dimensionality’ of need and the paralysis of 
agency not (only) through conscientization, but also through the ‘education of 
desire’ and epistemological revolt.  
 
There are several possible ways to disrupt one-dimensional thought. One is to 
attempt to convince others that an alternative view is valid and desirable by 
attempting to directly influence their existing emotional commitments and value 
orientations. In other words, we ‘redeem the normative validity claim directly by 
employing ethical arguments to sketch and defend the outlines of an alternative 
notion of the good life’ (Honneth 2007: 57). In this approach, debate is 
interpreted as the deliberate transformation of desire through rational and 
scientific persuasion. Throughout critical theory, this is generally regarded as the 
weakest, least effective and most analytically dubious approach to educating 
criticality. In another approach, these existing values and desires are ostensibly 
bracketed and the task is rather to immanently disclose, through critique and 
rhetorical device, the (inferior or inaccurate) interpretation of existing conditions. 
In this case, we ‘redeem the normative validity claim indirectly by giving such a 
radically new description of social reality as to alter our view of it fundamentally 
and change our value beliefs in the process’ (Honneth 2007: 57).  This approach, 
epitomised by first and second-generation critical theory, has long been the 
dominant practice in critical pedagogy.  
 
There is also a third approach to the education of desire which is grounded 
neither in moral education nor in immanent critique, but rather in critical 
speculation. This, according to Ruth Levitas (2005), is the function of utopia and 
the proper task of sociology itself. Objections may still be raised about the 
ontological status of the imagination, about how we can differentiate ‘critical’ 
from ‘uncritical’ utopias and ‘educated’ from ‘naïve’ hope; indeed, about the 
                                                 
35 Browne (2005: 65) describes critical theory as combining ‘utopian projections with the 
explication of the needs of subjects that are unfulfilled and the empirical analysis of the 
developmental tendencies of capitalist society’, not a method to ‘juxtapose an ideal state 
against existing conditions of oppression and inequality’. It is, in this definition, a 
‘synthesis of normative and empirical analysis to disclose change in the present that 
prefigure an emancipated or democratic society’.  
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epistemological criteria that we might use to distinguish desirable from 
undesirable visions of the future. However, if we assume that ‘scientific 
predictability does not [necessarily] coincide with the futuristic mode in which the 
truth exists’ (Marcuse 1989: 72), the paradox is less problematic. Honneth argues 
that the aim of a ‘disclosing critique of society’ such as the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, is to ‘change our value beliefs by evoking a new way of seeing the 
social world’ (2007: 58), not to stake claim on objective truth. Its sole purpose is 
to create alternative ideational conditions ‘under which a society conducts 
evaluative discourse on the ends of common action’ (Honneth 2007: 58). This 
differs considerably from the truth-claims of classical critical pedagogy, which are 
grounded in more 'scientific' conceptions of ideology critique. It also departs from 
‘educated hope’, which draws legitimacy from the possibility of rationally 
separating objectively ‘true’ from objectively ‘false’ forms of utopian imagination. 
In combination, therefore, world-disclosing critique and world-producing utopia 
point away from the traditional preoccupations of goal-oriented critical pedagogy 
and towards a more utopian philosophy of education.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Critical theorists have long believed that the possibility or impossibility of radical 
historical agency is both a political and a pedagogical problem. Rejecting both 
subjectivist and objectivist accounts of social change, they obstinately maintain 
that ‘another world is possible’ and that critical education has an important role to 
play in the process of creating it. However, they are deeply sceptical about the 
probability of radical social change on a grand scale, partly because of trenchant 
resistance to it, but also because they argue it can only occur if there are multiple 
and concurrent transformations: of existing material conditions, of ‘the human 
heart’, and of subjective needs, desires and inter-subjective relationships. This 
theory in particular is something that critical educators might bring more closely 
to home, as their work tends to presume the possibility of a division of political 
and intellectual labour. Lacking direct access to the material relations of 
production and often lacking organic connections to communities of struggle, 
critical educators tend to privilege (and sometimes overly so) the importance of 
analysis, critique and reflection in agency and social change.  
 
In this context, ‘critical hope’ is both a state of mind and a relationship of power, 
and the pedagogy of hope aims to enable agency by demystifying power 
relations, humanizing social relations, training the utopian imagination and 
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educating need and desire. However, whilst this thesis is central to the normative 
foundations of critical theory, it also remains contested and paradoxical in 
pedagogical practice. On the one hand, it is argued that critical theory is 
justifiable only when it expresses the pre-existing repressed needs of the 
oppressed and enables them to employ this critical consciousness to motivate and 
inform practices of empowerment. In this view, pedagogy is a relatively 
straightforward practice of nurturing, disciplining and legitimizing emergent 
political sentiment and action. Pedagogies of hope in this context are processes of 
education that make existing or potential possibilities within society visible where 
they are obscured by intellectual habits of determinism, fatalism, ignorance and 
fear. Here, pedagogy is understood as an important ‘rational’ dimension of 
political action; to speak of educating critical hope in this context is to refer either 
to the demystification of ‘false consciousness’, or to disciplining or making more 
‘scientific’ the pre-existing needs, desires or longings for emancipation and 
change so that they do not become ideological, fanatical or un-reflexive. 
 
On the other hand, however, it is also argued that human needs and desires are 
social constructions and hence themselves not necessarily reliable indicators of 
objective oppression. In fact, it is presumed that one of the greatest indications 
of generalised oppression in post-modern capitalist societies is the absence of the 
subjective desire for universal human needs such as peace, freedom and justice, 
either for oneself or for others. In other words, gross levels of apathy and 
indifference to the damaging consequences of capitalist relations – epitomised by 
the contemporary ‘crisis of hope’ – are interpreted as signs that the most 
fundamental instincts of human beings have been colonized by this logic. Under 
such conditions, critical theory aims not to theorize pre-existing needs for 
change, but rather to ‘work on consciousness’ to create the desire for change by 
reconstructing or ‘recognizing’ existing conditions as being antithetical to these 
universal (or universally desirable) human needs. Here, pedagogy is seen as prior 
to political agency and education is ascribed a central role in motivating social 
action. In this context, the definition of ‘critical hope’ shifts, so that criticality is 
not simply an ability to recognize injustice, but also to be ‘moved to change it’ 
(Burbules and Berk 1999: 50). Critical theory hence accepts a more affective 
remit, stretching beneath rational problems of structure and agency into the 
emotional and psychological dispositions that are seen to underlie them. This shift 
represents a migration from traditional ‘pedagogies of hope’ towards alternative 
traditions in the ‘education of desire’, and indeed, towards some of the most 
under-developed problematics in critical theory itself. 
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The tension which inheres between these two perspectives of the relationship 
between human subjectivity and social change, or pedagogy and practice, is often 
seen as a paralysing paradox: Marcuse articulated it and then proceeded to be 
vexed by it, while Adorno (1967) essentially abandoned hope in the possibility of 
large-scale revolution of social relations but concluded that ‘education and 
enlightenment might manage a little something’ to help individuals recognize and 
resist incivility and domination. Critical educators, on the other hand, argue that 
pedagogy has a considerably more significant role to play in transforming the 
subjective conditions of personal transcendence, political struggle and the 
creation of new types of inter-subjective ethics. However, very few critical 
theorists have actually concentrated on theorising the pedagogical dimensions of 
social change, instead leaving this largely to ‘pedagogues’ who often by dint of 
circumstance embed their theory-work in the narrow context of specific 
educational practices.36  
 
What is most needed now, therefore, is a set of conceptual tools which allows us 
to theorize the complex relationship between the social constitution of human 
subjectivity and the possibility of social change – a new theory of the relationship 
between pedagogical politics and political pedagogy – a post-modern critical 
theory that shies away from neither human anthropology nor the philosophy of 
knowledge – which takes the experienced impotence of the ‘crisis of hope’ as an 
‘active ingredient’ in its own thinking and acting – which recognizes educational 
and emotional transcendence as integral but not isolated practices of social 
transformation. What is needed, in short, is the broadening of new critical 
theories that enable us to understand the possibility of possibility in post-modern 
capitalist societies, and that educate the obstinacy of critical–utopian hope that is 
required for this difficult project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Notable exceptions to this include Henry Giroux, Douglas Kellner, Ilan Gur-Ze’ev and 
Peter McLaren. 
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